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Abstract—We address the dimensioning of infrastructure,
comprising both network and server resources, for large-scale
decentralized distributed systems such as grids or clouds. We
design the resulting grid/cloud to be resilient against network link
or server failures. To this end, we exploit relocation: under failure
conditions, a grid job or cloud virtual machine may be served at
an alternate destination (i.e., different from the one under failure-
free conditions). We thus consider grid/cloud requests to have a
known origin, but assume a degree of freedom as to where they
end up being served, which is the case for grid applications of the
bag-of-tasks (BoT) type or hosted virtual machines in the cloud
case. We present a generic methodology based on integer linear
programming (ILP) that (1) chooses a given number of sites in a
given network topology where to install server infrastructure, and
(2) determines the amount of both network and server capacity
to cater for both the failure free scenario and failures of links or
nodes. For the latter, we consider either failure independent (FID)
or failure dependent (FD) recovery. Case studies on European
scale networks show that relocation allows considerable reduction
of the total amount of network and server resources, especially
in sparse topologies and for higher numbers of server sites.
Adopting a failure dependent backup routing strategy does lead
to lower resource dimensions, but only when we adopt relocation
(especially for a high number of server sites): without exploiting
relocation, potential savings of FD versus FID are not meaningful.
Index Terms—Grid computing, Cloud computing, Optical
networks, Anycast, Dimensioning, ILP, Column generation, linear
programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of e-Science applications has been a major
driver for Grid computing. Solving scientific and engineering
problems increasingly relies on the availability of substantial
computing and storage resources, which can only be made
available at reasonable cost by sharing infrastructures. Initially
those scientific computing needs were addressed by dedicated
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high performance computing (HPC) infrastructure, such as
clusters. During the 1990s, the distributed computing com-
munity evolved towards the idea of what became commonly
known as a Grid [1]: in analogy with the power grid, this
would allow consumers to obtain computing power on de-
mand. The development of this concept gave birth to many
world-wide grid infrastructure initiatives [2]–[4]. Scientific
experiments run on such grids/clusters are submitted in units
called jobs, thus requiring specific interfaces for job submis-
sion, and schedulers with associated queuing mechanisms to
run them (i.e., making the decision when and where to run
what job/task, e.g., [5]). Applications are thus implemented
as a bag-of-tasks (BoT) applications, workflows and MPI
parallel processes. The complexity of figuring out where to
run each constituent of such sets of interdependent tasks
clearly increases, and various approaches to tackle the NP-
complete problem (i.e., allocating the interdependent tasks to
minimize total communication and execution costs) have been
identified [6].
Building on the basic concepts of grids, clouds manifest
themselves in more commercially oriented applications. A key
characteristic that clouds exploit is that of virtualization, as
in the case of Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) where one or
more virtual machines (VMs) are deployed on actual physical
servers. That virtualization enables migration to other servers,
both for performance and resilence against failures, and the
problem arises as how to make the choice of provisioning
which VMs at which physical servers (as well as the connec-
tivity towards it). To facilitate both grid and cloud applications
with efficient communication network infrastructure, optical
networks will play an important role (for an overview on
optical grids/clouds, see [7]).
In the current paper, we focus on an offline resilient dimen-
sioning problem: how to determine the amount of network
and server resources that are needed to meet a certain demand
of grid/cloud applications, under failure free conditions as
well as under single network or server failures? For the
applications, we will focus on those that can be executed
at a single location, which is typical for BoT as found
in many science and engineering applications (as explained
in [8]) or VM provisioning in the IaaS cloud case. We will
cater for applications that have non-negligible communication
and computation costs (i.e., which are not particularly biased
towards either data- or computation-intensive tasks). Thus, we
assume the traffic we need to cater for requires a given amount
of server resources, as well as a certain bandwidth between
the origin and the server location.
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Given the high bandwidth requirements typical for many of
the applications that we envisage [7], we assume the underly-
ing network will be an optical circuit-switched one, based on
Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM). For such optical
networks, the offline dimensioning problem has been widely
studied, but not in the particular grid/cloud context we are
considering here. Optical grid/cloud dimensioning is signifi-
cantly different, and especially challenging for providers that
need to plan and deploy both network and server resources (for
both storage and computing). Since users of such grids/clouds
typically do not care where exactly their workload is processed
(“in the cloud”), freedom arises as to where to install, e.g., data
centers. This amounts to the concept of anycast routing [9]:
the destination is not a priori given, but can be chosen among
a given set of candidate destinations. Consequently, a (source,
destination)-based traffic matrix, as assumed in traditional
(optical) network dimensioning problems — including many
routing and wavelength assignment (RWA) approaches — is
not a priori available in the grid/cloud scenario at hand.
To deal with network failures, various resilience strategies
for WDM networks have been devised [10]. The well-known
classical shared path protection scheme protects against single
link failures: a primary path from source to destination is
protected by a link-disjoint backup path which is used in case
of a failing link (since this link diversity guarantees that the
primary and backup paths will never fail simultaneously for
any single link failure). In a grid/cloud-like scenario however,
we proposed the idea of exploiting relocation [11], which
is applicable given the anycast principle: the backup path is
allowed to arrive at an alternate destination, possibly different
from the primary path’s end point under failure free conditions.
In this paper, we expand on the relocation idea to judge the
resource requirements to also cater for server site failures — in
fact, the dimensioning algorithms based on ILP formulations
can cater for any failure that can be modeled as a shared risk
link group (SRLG). The remainder of this paper is structured
as follows: we start off in the following Section II with an
overview of related work, where we also highlight the novel
contributions of this paper. Next, in Section III we summarize
our approach to resilient grid dimensioning, detailing its two
phases and associated model assumptions in the subsequent
Sections IV and V. Case studies on three 28-node European
network topology variants are discussed in Section VI. Our
overall conclusions are outlined in the final Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
In IP networks, the anycast routing problem typically con-
sists of finding a set of paths, one for each source node, such
that a particular cost (delay, bandwidth used, etc.) is mini-
mized. For this NP-hard problem, several heuristic algorithms
have been proposed (e.g., see [12] and references in [13]).
The current paper addresses anycast in optical circuit-
switched (OCS) WDM networks. (For works on optical burst
switching (OBS) anycast, we refer to [14], [15].) The anycast
routing problem in OCS WDM networks amounts to anycast
routing and wavelength assignment (ARWA), finding routes
for each anycast request while, e.g., minimizing the total
number of wavelengths used, and/or the load on the links [16].
In [17], that offline problem for a given set of static traffic
is solved in three subsequent phases: (i) destination decision,
(ii) path routing, and (iii) wavelength assignment. This phased
approach is shown to be outperformed by a heuristic algorithm
(based on simulated annealing and genetic algorithms) in [13].
A generalized static offline RWA problem, comprising not only
anycast, but also unicast and multicast requests, is described
in [18], where heuristic algorithms are proposed to solve it. A
similar problem is addressed in [19], but the author considers
the joint routing of both unicast and anycast connections, and
proposes a heuristic solution based on Langrangean relaxation.
(Note that [19] also briefly raises the associated online routing
problem. Heuristic solutions to online anycast routing in WDM
networks are also studied in [20], where the authors propose
to vary the number of candidate anycast sites over time,
according to time-varying load, and highlight the impact of
physical layer impairments.)
Whereas the above mentioned works addressed the anycast
routing problem in WDM networks to find working paths from
source to one of the candidate anycast destinations, the authors
of [21] extended the problem to also find backup paths. Also,
they considered grooming: traffic granularity is supposed to be
sub-wavelength and hence at intermediate nodes traffic flows
are re-combined to fill the wavelength channels as much as
possible. They solved the online routing problem using an
algorithm based on an auxiliary graph model, which finds
working and backup routes for a single incoming anycast
request. The offline problem, which we will focus on, is
addressed in [22], which considers the optimization of both
working and shared backup paths of anycast and unicast
demands jointly. The authors consider protection against single
link failures and apply shared path protection.
Note that the above works address the network dimen-
sions (i.e., wavelengths) only. However, we are interested
in grid/cloud scenarios, and hence also want to size the
server resources (for storage and computation). Online rout-
ing approaches taking into account both network and server
constraints for such a scenario are presented in, e.g., [23],
[24]. (Note that we consider requests that are entirely served
at a single data center; for, e.g., online scheduling of multiple
interdependent tasks, we refer to [25], [26].)
In the current paper, we are addressing the offline dimen-
sioning problem as first tackled in [27]. In that work, we
proposed a phased approach to determining both network and
server dimensions for an optical grid scenario, yet did not
consider resiliency. A similar problem, but assuming mobile
users, was addressed in [28] to find server locations and
amount of servers for the case of mobile thin client computing.
The authors of [29] consider a problem setting that is very
close to the one studied by us below: given a capacitated
network, including servers, they determine the placement of
content, as well as primary and backup routing of requests
for that content, with a given maximum number of replicas
per content item. Thus, the main differences between our
work and [29] boil down to the following: (i) the focus
in [29] is on minimizing used network resources, where server
capacity is only indirectly controlled by limiting the number
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of replicas per content item rather than minimizing/limiting
the server capacity; (ii) scalability of the solution approach:
[29] considers quite limited-scale case studies, i.e., limited
network sizes (11–14 nodes) and small traffic demands (up
to 30 requests), likely because their ILP approach does not
seem to scale to larger problem instances; (iii) the candidate
destination of an anycast (content) request in [29] is limited
to a subset of all available data center locations, whereas we
do not consider such limitation (although our model can be
fairly straightforwardly extended by adding constraints); (iv) to
protect against failures, [29] enforces relocation, whereas in
our default model relocation is optional (but can easily be
adapted to enforce it). Another difference in our approach is
that we assume an uncapacitated network (although constraints
can be easily added to cater for capacity limits).
To determine both network and server site dimensions for
a grid/cloud infrastructure that is resilient against both server
and network failures, we propose a two-step approach:
(S1) find the K most suitable locations to use as server sites
where to install data centers, and subsequently
(S2) determine the amount of network and server capacity
by finding suitable working and backup routes for all
grid/cloud traffic.
For step S1, we will expand upon the initial integer linear
programming (ILP) formulation from [27]. For step S2, in
contrast to [27], we will now: (i) solve the sub-problems
of establishing server and network capacity in an integrated
way, and (ii) additionally provide resilience against both server
and network failures. To this end, we will resort to an ILP-
based solution using column generation, similar to [30], [31].
Compared to the latter two works, we now extend our recent
work [32], [33] and (i) protect not only against network, but
also server failures (or in general, any failure that can be
modeled as an SRLG), (ii) simultaneously minimize network
and server capacity (instead of only network capacity), (iii) do
not fix the destination server site (under failure free conditions)
a priori, and (iv) compare failure-independent (FID) versus
failure-dependent (FD) backup path routing strategies.
Our novel contributions in the current paper beyond [32],
[33], include
• an extensive comparison of alternative ways of finding
K best server sites (beyond the simple approach we
previously reused from [27]), and
• an assessment of the influence of both (i) the choice of
the number of K server locations and (ii) the topology
(particularly the nodal degree), on the benefits of exploit-
ing relocation as well as the potential benefit of adopting
failure-dependent (FD) backup path routing.
III. DIMENSIONING RESILIENT GRIDS/CLOUDS
A. Problem statement
Stated formally, the dimensioning problem addressed is the
following [32]:
Given
• Topology comprising the sites where grid/cloud requests
originate, as well as the optical network interconnecting
them;
• Demand stating the amount of requests originating at each
of those sites; and
• Survivability requirements specifying the failures that
should be protected against,
Find
• K server site locations, chosen out of a given set of
candidate locations, where server infrastructure should be
provided;
• Destination sites and routes to follow for all grid/cloud
requests, originating with given intensity at the various
source sites (where each destination should be one of the
K server locations);
• Network and server capacity to provide on each of the
links and server sites;
Such that the total resource capacity (comprising both server
and network resources) is minimized.
Thus, the overall optimization objective will be to minimize
the infrastructure cost, covering both the (optical) core net-
work and the server capacity at each of the K data centers,
while ensuring survivability (e.g., by exploiting relocation, see
further). Also, note that we will consider unit requests (i.e.,
demanding a certain bandwidth and server capacity), where
multiple units originating from the same source possibly may
be sent to different server site locations.
As pointed out in the introduction, the requests we consider
can represent jobs from grid applications, or virtual machines
(VMs) to be provisioned in IaaS clouds, that can be met by
a single server site (which we assume to house an entire
data center, i.e., we consider dimensioning the backbone
network interconnecting such centers rather than intra-data
center interconnects). The demand will be expressed as a
request arrival intensity, with which we will associate a certain
network bandwidth to reserve between the request source
site and a server destination site (to be chosen amongst the
K server locations), as well as a certain amount of server
capacity. The network bandwidth will be expressed as the
sum of the number of wavelengths (aka lambdas) taken over
all links, and the server capacity as the number of central
processing units (CPUs) summed over all data center locations.
Thus, our model is generic and can be used both for data- and
computation intensive tasks.
To achieve resource capacity minimization, we will allow
sharing of both server and/or network resources for the backup
of requests whose resources under working conditions (aka
primary wavelengths and servers) are disjoint. In particular,
we will adopt a shared path protection [34], [35] concept.
Similarly, at each server site, we will install the minimum ca-
pacity required to cope with each one of the considered failure
scenarios (as well as the failure-free case, obviously). Thus,
we will allow reclaiming of server and network resources
for backup purposes, if they are no longer used as primary
resource under failure conditions.
We also want to thoroughly assess the impact of relocation,
as first studied in [11]: we will allow the backup destination
to be different from the primary one (cf. anycast). For long
running services (i.e., grid jobs, or applications communicating
with the cloud VMs), one could assume this will involve
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Fig. 1. Input data: (i) network links and nodes (OXCs labeled A-D), (ii) source
nodes with job arrival intensity (represented as users), and (iii) candidate
server sites.
migration. (Migration was originally developed for load bal-
ancing in a server cluster such as MOSIX [36] or Condor [37],
and initially only applied to processes without inter-process
communication, a drawback that was overcome in [38], [39]
or could be circumvented by virtualization [40].) In the current
work, we however do not take into account any extra resource
requirements that such migration would involve, since we
are focussing on a static network dimensioning problem (the
request rates are to be seen as steady state traffic estimates,
i.e., long-time averages or upper bounds thereof) and not
on an online scenario that deals with short-term variations
(i.e., we accept potential temporary degradation of the service
during the failover procedure). For an assessment of failover
techniques such as replication and checkpointing (which are
thus out-of-scope in the work at hand), we refer to [41].
We will express the survivability requirement through the
concept of a shared risk link group (SRLG): a set of resources
(links) that may fail jointly, because of shared dependencies
(e.g., fibre ducts [42]). Thus, to protect against failure of an
SRLG, the backup resources should not include any of the
SRLG elements. In our case studies, we will protect against
single failures, where the single resource that fails can be
either a server or a network link (whereas in earlier work,
we only considered network failures [11], [30]). Also, our
previous work [32] considered complete server site failures
(which would amount to 1+1 protection in terms of number
of server resources, if we do not relocate), whereas now
our models more generically cater for 1:N server protection.
We will adopt a network model (explained in detail in the
next subsection) where such a server failure is modeled as
a failure of a link to the data center site. Thus, failures of
the real-world fiber links as well as servers will be modeled
as SRLG failures comprising modeled links. Adopting this
generic SRLG model, our ILP formulations will allow to study
any failure scenario (e.g., the single link or server failures that
we will analyze, but also complete OXC failures) that can be
represented as an SRLG.
B. Network model
We will focus on WDM networks interconnecting the data
centers providing grid/cloud services and consider the network
model illustrated in Fig. 1:
G = (V,L), directed graph representing an optical
grid/cloud, where V is the node set and L is the set
of (directed) links, where every link has the same
unlimited transport capacity.
V = VSRC∪VNET∪VDST, the set of all nodes, indexed by
v, comprising pure OXCs (VNET), server sites VDST
(with |VDST| = K), and explicitly modeled sources
VSRC.
L = LSRC∪LNET∪LDST, the set comprising all directed
network links, indexed by `, again split into the core
network links LNET interconnecting OXCs, and the
modeled access links LSRC from request sources and
those towards the server sites LDST.
∆v is the number of unit demand requests1, originating
from a source node v ∈ VSRC. A unit demand
will be associated with a single bandwidth unit
(i.e., a wavevelength) and a single server. (It is
fairly straightforward to introduce a separate server
demand Γv , to account for decoupled server and
network requirements.)
S represents the set of SRLGs, where an individual
s ∈ S is a set of links that can simultaneously fail
(implying that S ⊆ 2L, where 2L is the powerset of
L). Note that the empty set (s = ∅) will denote the
failure free case.
We also will use the following notations:
IN(v) represents the set of v’s incoming links.
OUT(v)represents the set of v’s outgoing links.
Note that the server links LDST will be used to count the
required server capacity. Thus, they constitute a modeling
trick: the link capacity of link ` ∈ LDST will actually represent
the number of server CPUs that we need at the data center site
it connects to. The link capacity of network links `′ ∈ LNET
will be expressed in number of wavelengths. Our model
will assume a priori unlimited network and server capacity
(thus representative of a greenfield situation), yet can easily
be extended to include given capacity upper bounds. Note
that we also assume wavelength conversion to be possible
in intermediate nodes, i.e., we will not enforce wavelength
continuity constraints.
As indicated before (see above, Section II), we will use two
steps: (S1) find the best server locations, and (S2) find the
amount of servers at each of those locations, as well as routes
for the request data traffic to follow towards those servers,
from which we derive the amount of wavelengths on each of
the network links. The following two sections detail each of
those steps. Before discussing them, note that for step (S1)
we assume the number of server locations K is given a priori,
and we thus do not optimize that number (but we do discuss
the impact of different K values in Section VI-B). Clearly,
increasing K would allow shorter paths for demands and
hence lower network capacity requirements, as well as better
opportunities to spread the risk of server failures (assuming at
most one failing data center, and perfect load balancing, we
need in the order of 1/K backup capacity). Yet, having many
data center locations incurs additional capital and operational
expenses not incorporated in the model below.
1Note that our model can easily be extended to multiple traffic types, that
each can have different (number of) destination sites to serve it.
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IV. CHOOSING K SERVER LOCATIONS (STEP S1)
We assume that the number of server sites, K, is given
a priori, but not their locations. To solve this problem of
finding the K best locations, given the topology and the
demand, in [27] we originally proposed a clustering heuristic2
and an ILP approach. Below, we present and extend the ILP
approach to account for both working and backup resources (as
[27] did not consider protection). In terms of aforementioned
network model, the current step (S1) will fix the data center
locations, i.e., determine VDST. The ILP model below will
therefore consider only the network of OXCs (i.e., VNET) as
given. Hence, we will associate demand ∆v′ with the OXC v′
connected to the source node v (∆v′ = ∆v).
Our approach is based on some simplifying assumptions:
(i) each source site v will send all its requests to a single
destination Dv , and (ii) shortest path routing is used. Hence,
given a choice of K locations, a site v will send its requests
to server site v′ if the routing distance hvv′ is the minimum
over all hvv′′ values for v′′ = 1..K. This can be formulated
easily as an ILP, by introducing the following variables and
parameters:
tv is a binary variable, equalling 1 if and only if site
v is chosen as one of the K server sites, i.e., v is a
potential target for anycast traffic.
fvv′ is a binary variable, equalling 1 if and only if source
node v sends its requests to server site v′.
hvv′ is a given parameter, accounting for the cost (e.g.,
hop count) of sending a unit request’s data traffic
from v to v′.
The original ILP (rephrased from [27]), thus becomes:
min
∑
v∈VNET
∑
v′∈VNET
∆v · hvv′ · fvv′ , (1)
subject to: ∑
v∈VNET
tv = K, (2)∑
v′∈VNET
fvv′ = 1 ∀v ∈ VNET, (3)
fvv′ ≤ tv′ ∀v, v′ ∈ VNET. (4)
The objective (1) thus is to minimize the total number of
primary wavelengths (assuming each unit demand ∆v calls for
a single wavelength) that would need to be foreseen, if hvv′
stands for the length of the shortest path from v to v′. We will
refer to this location choosing approach as SW (from shortest
working path).
As indicated before, we will be dimensioning resilient
grids/clouds using a path protection approach. The SW choos-
ing approach however only accounts for working paths. Hence,
we devised a SC approach (from shortest cycle), where we use
the same ILP (1)–(4), but now set hvv′ to the length of the
shortest combination of two link-disjoint paths between nodes
v and v′ (e.g., using Suurballe’s algorithm [44]).
2Basically we rephrased the well-known k-means clustering algorithm [43]
as a k-medoids algorithm using shortest path lengths as distance metric rather
than euclidian distance.
The SC chooser thus accounts for both a working and a
backup path to the same destination. Yet, if we allow reloca-
tion, the backup path can end in a different site. Therefore, we
also will consider an SRO chooser (from shortest relocation
optional), and introduce the following variable and parameter:
fvv′v′′ is a binary variable, equalling 1 if and only if source
node v sends its requests to primary server site v′
under normal, and to backup site v′′ under failure
conditions.
hvv′v′′ is a given parameter, accounting for the cost of
sending a unit request demand from v to v′ under
normal, and to v′′ under failure conditions.
The SRO chooser ILP thus becomes (5)–(9), with hvv′v′′
defined as the sum of the lengths of the shortest combination
of 2 disjoint paths from v to v′ and v′′. The latter can
be easily computed using any well-known disjoint path (or
shortest cycle) algorithm (e.g., [44]), extending the topology
for this purpose with an additional virtual node σ connected
to the primary (v) and backup (v′) server sites (similarly to
the approach of [23] to solve the anycast routing problem; see
also Section V-A2).
min
∑
v∈VNET
∑
v′∈VNET
∑
v′′∈VNET
∆v · hvv′v′′ · fvv′v′′ (5)
subject to: ∑
v∈VNET
tv = K (6)∑
v′∈VNET
∑
v′′∈VNET
fvv′v′′ = 1 ∀v ∈ VNET (7)
fvv′v′′ ≤ tv′ ∀v, v′, v′′ ∈ VNET (8)
fvv′v′′ ≤ tv′′ ∀v, v′, v′′ ∈ VNET. (9)
Table I summarizes the choosers we will evaluate later in
Section VI-A. For the chosen data center locations v ∈ VNET
(i.e., those for which tv = 1), we will expand the network
by adding server nodes v′ ∈ VDST, connected via links ` =
(v, v′) ∈ LDST (as in Fig. 1) and continue with step S2.
V. DIMENSIONING THE NETWORK AND SERVERS (STEP S2)
For a chosen set VDST comprising K server locations, in step
S2 we determine for each request which primary and backup
server sites to use, as well as via which route to connect to
them, in order to minimize the total network (i.e., wavelengths)
and server capacity. As indicated before, we aim to ensure that
we can meet the demand for network and server capacity also
under failure scenarios.
Those failure scenarios will be generically represented as
SRLGs. In our case studies, we will in particular consider
single failures of either bidirectional links, or servers. A
bidirectional network link failure will be modeled as an SRLG
comprising the two opposite directed links (`, `′ ∈ LNET)
between two network nodes. Since we model servers as the
links between network and server nodes, a server failure will
be represented as a failing link ` ∈ LDST. As indicated, we
are interested in providing 1:N server protection. One way to
model this, is to provide N +1 parallel links between a single
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Table I
OVERVIEW OF THE VARIOUS LOCATION CHOOSER STRATEGIES.
Chooser Explanation ILP model
SW Accounts for a single shortest path to a server site. (1)–(4), with hvv′ = length of shortest path from v to
v′
SC Accounts for disjoint primary and backup paths to the same server site
(i.e., using shortest cycle).
(1)–(4), with hvv′ = length of shortest cycle joining v
and v′
SRO Accounts for disjoint primary and backup paths to possibly different
server sites, i.e., optional relocation.
(5)–(9), with hvv′v′′ = sum of lengths of the shortest
combination of two disjoint paths from v to v′ and v′′
pair of network and server nodes, and let only a single one
of them fail. If we do not use relocation (i.e., the NR case),
we however know that the same destination will be chosen,
and we can simply calculate the total number of servers from
the maximum number of operational servers, say x, that is
required to meet the demand. Indeed, since 1:N protection
implies that for N servers, 1 additional backup server will
be provided to cater for the case that at most one of the
N primary servers fails, we then need to install a total of
d(1 + 1/N)·xe servers. Hence, in the NR case, we do not need
to explicitly model server link failures, but can accommodate
1:N protection with an overprovisioning factor ρ` = 1 + 1/N
for the capacity of links ` ∈ LDST.
We will consider two protection strategies of coping with
the failures. The first considers a single backup path for each
unit request, i.e., we adopt a shared path protection concept.
Thus, for a given request unit the alternate path (possibly to
a different destination) under any failure condition affecting
the primary path is always the same. This is generally known
as failure-independent (FID) restoration [42], [45], [46],
which previously also has been described as state-independent
restoration [47], [48]. The second protection strategy is that of
failure-dependent (FD), aka state-dependent, backup routing:
the alternate path (and possibly alternate destination) can be
different for each individual failure scenario. Both FID and
FD strategies are described in detail below.
A. Failure-independent (FID) backup path routing with relo-
cation
1) Methodology: Given the scalability issues of a single
ILP problem formulation addressing the FID case (see [31]),
we use a column generation (CG) approach to find so-called
configurations and the number of times to use them. A config-
uration c ∈ C will be associated with a particular source-site
v ∈ VSRC, and will consist of a pair of working and backup
paths, both originating from v and terminating in one of the
server sites in VDST (possibly different in case of relocation).
This involves solving what are called the Restricted Master
Problem (RMP) and a Pricing Problem (PP) iteratively. The
next subsections will detail the constituent phases of a CG
scheme, that can be summarized as follows:
1) Find a set of initial configurations and assign it to C;
2) Solve the linear program (LP) relaxation of the RMP,
minimizing required network and server resources;
3) Solve the PP to try and find a new configuration c
for a source node v ∈ VSRC, that could lead to a cost
reduction of the RMP objective function (i.e., that has a
negative reduced cost). If successful, add c to the set of
configurations C.
4) Repeat steps 2–3 until no new configurations (with neg-
ative reduced cost) can be found.
5) Solve the final resulting RMP as ILP, to find an integer
solution, determining the number of times zc to use each
configuration c ∈ C.
In each iteration of Step 3, source nodes VSRC are considered
in a round-robin fashion. Step 2 is performed every time
a new configuration was added in Step 3. (For the CG
methodology, see also [31].) Note that the gap between the
resulting objective function value of the ILP and LP solutions
of the RMP is very small (for the case study results, the relative
ILP vs. LP gap on average amounted to below 0.50%, with
an observed maximum of at most a few %).
2) Finding initial configurations: To find initial configu-
rations, we use a heuristic inspired by [49], and detailed in
Algorithm 1. We introduce the set of candidate server locations
VLOC. For the case without relocation, VLOC = VDST. Yet,
for the case with relocation, we add a (virtual) node σ to
the node set V of the graph, and introduce additional links
(v, σ) ,∀v ∈ VDST and set VLOC = {σ}. Then, for each source
site v ∈ VSRC, we find initial configurations by finding the
shortest pair of disjoint paths to each candidate server site
in VLOC. For this, we use the algorithm originally developed
by Suurballe and Tarjan [44]. In a subsequent step, we find
additional configurations by trying to find alternate backup
paths that share links with other configuration’s backup.
3) Restricted Master Problem (RMP): The parameters and
variables of our column generation ILP are:
c A configuration, defined for a given source node v ∈
VSRC.
Cv The set of configurations associated with a source
node v ∈ VSRC.
C =
⋃
v∈VSRC
Cv
S The set of SRLGs, indexed by s.
zc Integer decision variable, counting the number of
times configuration c is used.
pWc` Binary parameter, equaling 1 if and only if link ` is
used in the working path in configuration c.
pBc` Binary parameter, equaling 1 if and only if link ` is
used in the backup path in configuration c.
w` Auxiliary integer variable, counting the number of
wavelengths used on link `.
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Algorithm 1 Finding an initial set of configurations C
1: // Find shortest paths from each source to each possible
destination
2: C0 ← ∅
3: for all v ∈ VSRC, and s ∈ VLOC do
4: c← DisjointPathPair(v, s)
5: c′ ← c with working and backup swapped
6: Add c and c′ to C0.
7: end for
8: // Find new configurations that share (part of) backup path
with others
9: C ← C0
10: for c ∈ C0 do
11: Construct a copy G′ of the graph G.
12: Remove links of working path of c from G′.
13: for all c′′ ∈ C with c′′ 6= c do
14: if working paths of c′′ and c are disjoint then
15: In G′, set weights of backup path links of c′′ to 0.
16: end if
17: end for
18: Construct a new configuration c′.
19: Set working path of c′ to that of c.
20: Set backup path of c′ to shortest path in G′ between
source and backup destination of c.
21: if backup path c′ shorter than that of c then
22: Add c′ to C.
23: end if
24: end for
The master problem will determine which configurations
to use, using decision variables zc. The objective function is
given in (10): we minimize the amount of network resources
(wavelengths w` for ` ∈ LNET) and the amount of server
resources, which is modeled as the capacity of the links
towards server nodes (w` for ` ∈ LDST). We introduce a
factor α that expresses the cost ratio of a single unit of server
capacity (i.e., a single server CPU), compared to the cost of
a single unit of network bandwidth (i.e., a wavelength) on a
single link. (Recall that we assume 1 unit request asks for 1
network capacity unit, and 1 server unit.)
min
( ∑
`∈LNET
w` + α ·
∑
`∈LDST
w`
)
(10)
Note that our formulation implies that the number of server
resources required for a unit demand of jobs is assumed to be
linearly proportional to the bandwidth (i.e., wavelengths) they
need. Yet, by introducing another set of parameters stating
the amount of server resources required for jobs originating
at source site v (e.g., define Γv), it is fairly straightforward
to rewrite the model (i.e., add a factor Γv/∆v to the zc
in equations (12)-(13) below). For ease of notation, in the
following we stick to the assumption that each unit request
needs a single wavelength and single server CPU.
In the case with no relocation (NR), we will calculate the
number of servers (whose amount is expressed as w` for
` ∈ LDST), by introducing a factor to account for 1:N server
protection:
ρ` An overprovisioning factor that we will use in the
(NR) case, when we use 1:N server protection (see
before; for ` ∈ LDST it will be 1 + 1/N and 1 for
the network links ` ∈ LNET). For any other scenario
(no server protection, or the relocation case (RO)), it
will be 1 for all links.
The first set of constraints (11) are obviously to meet the
requested demands. Next, in constraints (12) we enforce the
number of wavelengths to be sufficient to carry all selected
configurations under failure-free conditions. For each consid-
ered failure case, represented as an SRLG s ∈ S, we have
constraints (13), of which the right hand side comprises as
first term a summation covering all unaffected configurations
and secondly the affected ones. Therefore, we define two
auxiliary parameters (whose values in this RMP are constants,
depending on the configuration at hand; they will be variables
in the PP):
piWc`s Binary, equaling 1 if and only if the working
path of configuration c crosses link `, which re-
mains unaffected by failure of SRLG s (thus, ` ∈
workingPath(c) and workingPath(c) ∩ s = ∅).
piBc`s Binary, equaling 1 if and only if link ` is part of the
backup path of configuration c, whose working path
is affected by SRLG s (that is, ` ∈ backupPath(c)
and workingPath(c) ∩ s 6= ∅).
(Note that according to (13), we only need to define piWc`s
and piBc`s for ` /∈ s.) Observe that this model does not limit
the maximal capacity of either links or server nodes (i.e., we
assume an uncapacitated network), yet capacity constraints can
be trivially imposed through upper bounds for w`.∑
c∈Cv
zc ≥ ∆v ∀v ∈ VSRC (11)
w` ≥ ρ` ·
∑
c∈C
pWc` · zc ∀` ∈ L (12)
w` ≥ ρ` ·
(∑
c∈C
piWc`s · zc +
∑
c∈C
piBc`s · zc
)
∀s ∈ S,∀` /∈ s.
(13)
4) Pricing Problem (PP): Solving the master problem with
the set of all possible configurations is not scalable. Yet, in
order to answer the dimensioning question, it suffices that the
master problem includes the possible configurations associated
with a non-zero basis variable to reach the overall optimum
(of the linear relaxation). Thus, in the column generation
approach, we start from an initial limited set of promising
configurations and solve the master only for a subset of all
possible configurations: this is the Restricted Master Problem
(RMP). Based on the solution of the RMP, we subsequently
add new configurations c by solving the pricing problem (PP):
it finds such c that is able to reduce the RMP objective value.
In our case, a PP is associated with a given source node
vSRC ∈ VSRC. The PP uses the values (as found by the RMP,
relaxed as linear program) of dual variables corresponding to
constraints of the RMP:
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u1v value of RMP dual variable corresponding to (11).
u2` value of RMP dual variable corresponding to (12).
u3`s value of RMP dual variable corresponding to (13).
(Note that u1v will be positive, while u
2
` and u
3
`s will be
negative, given the different position of zc with respect to the
inequality sign in (11) versus (12) and (13).)
The objective function (14) of the PP will be to minimize
the reduced cost. (The first explicit 0 term is the coefficient of
zc in the RMP objective.) The PP’s decision variables p and
its auxiliary variables pi have the same definitions as before,
but we drop the c index.
min COST(p, pi) =
0− u1vSRC +
∑
`∈L
u2` · ρ` · pW` +
∑
s∈S
∑
`/∈s
u3`s · ρ` ·
(
piW`s + pi
B
`s
)
.
(14)
The first set of equations (15) represent the flow conserva-
tion equations, expressing that the net flow going into a node
should be either−1 (for the source node), +1 (for a destination
node) or 0 otherwise.
∑
`∈IN(v)
p?` −
∑
`∈OUT(v)
p?` =

−1 if v = vSRC∑
`∈IN(v)
p?` if v ∈ VDST
0 otherwise
∀v ∈ V and ? = W,B.
(15)
Next, constraints (16) assure that there will be no loops,
and exactly 1 working and backup path will be constructed.
Additionally (17) enforces that a single working and backup
destination will be chosen. Finally, working and backup paths
obviously need to be disjoint (18) with respect to an SRLG
s ∈ S (note that we protect against single SRLG failures only).
∑
`∈IN(v)
p?` ≤ 1,
∑
`∈OUT(v)
p?` ≤ 1, ∀v ∈ V, ? = W,B (16)∑
`∈LDST
p?` = 1, for ? = W,B (17)
pW` + p
B
`′ ≤ 1, ∀s ∈ S, ∀`, `′ ∈ s. (18)
It remains to define constraints so that the definitions of
piW and piB apply as before. For this, we define additional
auxiliary variables aWs , each associated with an SRLG s ∈ S:
aWs Binary variable, equaling 1 if any of the links `
′ ∈ s
is used as working link (i.e., if ∃`′ ∈ s : pW`′ = 1),
hence if the chosen working path is affected by the
SRLG.
Constraints (19) enforce that piW`s ≡ pW` ∧ ¬aWs , and con-
straints (20) ensure the logical relation piB`s ≡ pB` ∧ aWs , to
express the definitions of pi·· given before. The definition of
aWs amounts to a
W
s ≡
∨
`′∈s
pW`′ , or thus (21).
piW`s ≥ pW` − aWs
piW`s ≤ pW`
piW`s ≤ 1− aWs
∀s ∈ S, ∀` /∈ s (19)
piB`s ≥ pB` + aWs − 1
piB`s ≤ pB`
piB`s ≤ aWs
∀s ∈ S, ∀` /∈ s (20)
M · aWs ≥
∑
`′∈s
pW`′
aWs ≤
∑
`′∈s
pW`′
∀s ∈ S,with M = |s| . (21)
The above constraints all apply regardless whether we
consider relocation or not. Yet, if we do not want to relocate,
we need to enforce one additional constraint (22), stating that
working and backup destination need to be the same:∑
`∈IN(v)
pW` =
∑
`∈IN(v)
pB` , ∀v ∈ VDST. (22)
Note that the summations are there to account for parallel links
between an OXC and a server site (links LDST in Fig. 1). Such
parallel links can be used to model protection against server
failures (see above).
Alternatively, if we want to enforce relocation, i.e., we do
not allow working and backup server site to be the same, then
we can include the following constraint:∑
`∈IN(v)
pW` +
∑
`∈IN(v)
pB` ≤ 1, ∀v ∈ VDST. (23)
One final remark: the above model can easily accommodate
the analysis of cases where not all traffic is anycast, i.e., a
mixture of unicast and anycast (as in [22]), by enforcing p?` =
1 for the particular unicast destination’s link ` ∈ LDST (and
fixing p?`′ = 0 for the other server links `
′ ∈ LDST \ `). Our
case studies discussed next, however, will focus on anycast
traffic only.
B. Failure-dependent (FD) backup path routing with reloca-
tion
To study the FD case, we make use of a reasonably
straightforward ILP as sketched below. Since we did not
observe scalability issues in studying fairly large problems
(as exemplified in Section VI), we did not resort to column
generation as in the FID case.
In addition to the constants ρ` as defined before in Sec-
tion V-B, we define the following ILP variables:
pv`s The number of unit demands originating from v ∈
VSRC that are crossing link ` ∈ L under failure of
s ∈ S (s = ∅ represents the failure free case).
w` The capacity to provide on link ` ∈ L. For network
links ` ∈ LNET, it amounts to the number of wave-
lengths. For data center links ` ∈ LDST, it represents
the number of servers to install at that site.
The objective is given in (24): we minimize the amount of
network resources (wavelengths w`) and the amount of server
DEVELDER et al.: JOINT DIMENSIONING OF SERVER AND NETWORK INFRASTRUCTURE FOR RESILIENT OPTICAL GRIDS/CLOUDS 9
resources, which, in our model, is conveniently represented
as the capacity on server links. We introduce a factor α that
expresses the cost ratio of the server capacity corresponding
to a workload filling a single wavelength with data, compared
to the cost of a single wavelength on a single link (as before
in the FID case).
min
( ∑
`∈LNET
w` + α ·
∑
`∈LDST
w`
)
. (24)
The first set of constraints constitute the demand constraints
which dictate where traffic originates (25)–(26) and ends
(27), as well as the traditional flow conservation constraint
in intermediate network nodes (28). These constraints have to
hold ∀v ∈ VSRC,∀s ∈ S.
pv`′s = ∆v where {`′} = OUT(v) (25)
pv`s = 0 ∀` ∈ LSRC \ OUT(v) (26)∑
`∈LDST
pv`s = ∆v (27)∑
`∈IN(v′)
pv`s =
∑
`∈OUT(v′)
pv`s ∀v′ ∈ VNET. (28)
The next constraint (29) expresses that traffic cannot cross
affected links for each respective failure scenario:
pv`s = 0 ∀v ∈ VSRC,∀s ∈ S,∀` ∈ s. (29)
The final constraint amounts to counting the capacity re-
quired for each link (or data center), where ρ` is defined as in
the FID case:
w` ≥ ρ` ·
∑
v∈VSRC
pv`s ∀v ∈ VSRC,∀s ∈ S, ∀` ∈ LNET ∪ LDST.
(30)
The equations (24)–(30) cover the case of failure-dependent
backup routing, exploiting relocation (if it is beneficial). To
obtain resource dimensions for the non-relocation case, we
need to enforce that for all failure cases the same data center is
chosen as in the failure free case. This implies ∀v ∈ VSRC,∀s ∈
S \ {s′}, s′ = ∅, ∀v′ ∈ VDST:∑
`∈IN(v′)
pv`s =
∑
`∈IN(v′)
pv`s′ . (31)
(As before, the summation is only there for the case where
we have parallel server links in our network model.)
As a final remark, note that the model defined by (24)–(30)
amounts to optional relocation, i.e., an alternate destination
site will only be chosen if that leads to lower overall costs
as per the objective. In case we want to enforce relocation
under failure conditions (as in [29]), we can impose that if v′
is used as destination under working conditions, then it cannot
serve under failure scenarios. This amounts to the following
constraint3, ∀v ∈ VSRC, ∀v′ ∈ VDST, s′ = ∅: ∑
`∈IN(v′)
pv`s′ 6= 0
⇒
 ∑
`∈IN(v′)
∑
s∈S\{s′}
pv`s = 0
 . (32)
3Note that a constraint of the form (a 6= 0) ⇒ (b = 0) is logically
equivalent to (a = 0) ∨ (b = 0), which can be easily modeled as linear
constraints. Let A,B be binary variables, so that A ≡ (a = 0) and B ≡
(b = 0). Then the ∨ constraint becomes A+B ≥ 1.
(Again, summation over IN(v′) is necessary in the case of
parallel server links in the network model.)
VI. CASE STUDIES
We evaluated the above methodology on European network
topologies taken from [50], as illustrated in Fig. 2: (a) EU-
basic comprising 28 nodes and 41 bidirectional links (avg.
nodal degree of 2.93), (b) EU-sparse with 28 nodes and 34
bidirectional links (avg. node degree of 2.42), and (c) EU-
dense with 28 nodes and 60 bidirectional links (avg. node de-
gree of 4.29). We will consider demand instances comprising
varying number unit demands of jobs, where each unit demand
will be assumed to require a single full wavelength and one
server. (As indicated before, the (CG-)ILP models can be
easily adapted to uncorrelated server and wavelength require-
ments.) The total number of unit demands (i.e.,
∑
v∈V ∆v)
will vary between 10 and 350, to demonstrate the scalability
of our approach. For each given number of unit demands, we
have randomly generated 10 instances, drawing the sources
v uniformly from the set V of 28 network nodes. Hence,
each data point for a given number of unit demands in the
graphs that will be presented will constitute the average over
the respective 10 random instances.
We will assess the benefit of exploiting relocation when
protecting against failures, in two scenarios: (i) single link
failures only (1L), or (ii) single failures of either a link or
a server (1LS). The modeling approach is the following, as
summarized formally in Table II:
• NR: No relocation, i.e., primary and backup server sites
have to be the same:
– 1L: For the single network link failure case, we will
consider that a single bidirectional link will completely
fail. In our network model, this corresponds to an
SRLG comprising the two opposite directed links.
– 1LSN: The single failure a bidirectional network link
will be modeled similarly as for 1L. In addition, we
need to cater for single server failures. Yet, we will not
model them as additional SRLGs, but we will rather
(as explained before) account for backup capacity at a
particular data center site through an overprovisioning
factor ρ` for the single link ` ∈ LDST connecting it to a
network node (recall that that link’s capacity represents
the number of servers to install).
• RO: Relocation is optional, thus primary and backup
server sites can (but not necessarily will) differ, if this
is beneficial in terms of cost (i.e., leads to lower total
network and server resource dimensions).
– 1L: Single link failures are modeled as for the NR case.
– 1LS: Again, single link failures will be modeled
through SRLGs. To model server failures, we will use
1+N parallel server links connecting each data center
to its corresponding network node, of which only at
most one will fail (each modeled as a singleton SRLG).
The total capacity over the 1 + N links together will
reflect the required number of servers to achieve 1:N
protection.
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Fig. 2. EU network topologies used for the case studies, which all comprise 28 nodes: (a) Basic topology, with 41 bidirectional links (the base topology
from [50]), (b) Sparse topology with only 34 bidirectional links (the ring topology from [50]), and (c) Dense topology with 60 bidirectional links (the
triangular topology from [50]).
Table II
MODEL SETTINGS FOR THE CONSIDERED FAILURE SCENARIOS.
Case ILP model settings
1L S = {{`, `′} : `, `′ ∈ LNET,
` and `′ are each other’s reverse} , S1L
ρ` = 1, ∀` ∈ L
|LDST| = K (single server link per data center site)
1LS S = S1L ∪ {{`} : ` ∈ LDST}
ρ` = 1, ∀` ∈ L
|LDST| = (1 +N) ·K (parallel server links)
1LSN S = S1L
ρ` = 1 + 1/N if ` ∈ LDST, else 1
|LDST| = K (single server link per data center site)
Note that in the model for the latter 1LS case, we indeed
achieve truly optional relocation: we allow the choice between
adding extra backup server resources and relocating. In this
RO case, a failure of a server is modeled as a single failing
` ∈ LDST and can be resolved by either (i) adding extra server
capacity locally (modeled as extra capacity on a parallel link
`′ ∈ LDST to the same v ∈ VDST destination as in the failure
free case), or by (ii) relocating to another server site v′ ∈ VDST
while accounting also for possibly extra network capacity on
the path towards it.
A. Finding the best K server locations
Our first set of studies aimed to evaluate the most suitable
chooser to use. For this, we considered case studies on the
EU-basic and EU-sparse topologies. We used the various
location chooser strategies formally presented in Section IV
for step S1, and subsequently used either one of the (CG-)ILP
approaches for failure-dependent (FD) or failure-independent
(FID) backup routing for step S2, as detailed in Section V. In
particular, the chooser strategies we considered are:
• SW, SC, SRO: See Table I, using the randomly generated
demands ∆v (ranging between 10 and 350 unit requests).
• Random: This is a benchmark case, where we randomly
select K server sites amongst all network nodes V .
To compare the various chooser strategies, we will obvi-
ously look at the total cost, in terms of server and network
resources that are required for the resulting dimensioned
grid/cloud. We expect that the difference will mainly pertain to
the network dimensions, i.e., wavelengths, since the location of
servers will most likely not have a significant influence on the
number of servers that will be required to match the demand.
Looking at the rationale of our various choosers (see Table I),
we expect that (i) SC will lead to lowest resource requirements
when we do not relocate (i.e., the NR cases); (ii) SRO will
be the best choice when considering relocation, at least when
considering server failures (1LS, RO), but likely also in case
of just link failures (1L, RO).
The comparison of the various choosers is summarized in
Fig. 3, Fig. 4 and Table III. We note that for NR our intuitive
expectation is met and SC indeed leads to overall minimal cost
(i.e., comparing the minimum cost over the various location
choices). Similarly, for RO with 1LS we find SRO to be best.
However, for the RO with 1L case we find that SC more often
than SRO leads to lower cost. The reason could be that to
protect against single link failures only (1L), relocation does
not lead to a cost reduction that is as substantial as in the 1LS
case (see further, Section VI-B). Yet, note that the difference
among all intelligent choosers (i.e., SW, SC, SRO) is limited:
e.g., in the EU-basic topology, the total costs they achieve
differ only by a few % (for EU-basic, FID, maximally 3%
in the NR case; in the RO case less than 1.6% for 1L, and
less than 1% for 1LS). Since these differences fall within
the 95% confidence intervals, they are not significant. Thus,
what this comparison between these choosers seems to learn is
that any “good enough” choice of servers achieve almost the
same overall cost (in terms of network and server capacity)
— which however is significantly lower than a purely random,
non-intelligent choice. In the remainder of this paper, we will
stick to the SC chooser.
B. Exploiting relocation to ensure resilience
In the case of protecting against single link failures (1L), we
note the clear advantage of exploiting relocation on network
capacity (see Fig. 5): for K = 3 we observe a reduction of the
required number of wavelengths in the order of around 8.9%
(average over the larger demands ∆v ∈ [100, 350] cases). The
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Fig. 3. The relative difference in total cost between the intelligent choosers SW, SC, SRO is limited, but that total cost is substantially higher for the random
data center location chooser baseline (RND). The graphs show (i) for which fraction of the 10 random cases per demand size each chooser performed best,
(ii) the relative total cost difference compared that for SC, i.e., cost(x)/average cost(SC)− 1, where error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval. (RO:
optional relocation; NR: no relocation; 1L: single link failure protection; 1LS: protection against single failures of either a link or a server; 1LSN: single link
failure and 1:N server protection.)
Table III
COMPARISON OF THE VARIOUS CHOOSERS, IN TERMS OF FOR HOW MANY
OF THE 100 RANDOMLY GENERATED DEMAND INSTANCES (I.E., 10
INSTANCES FOR EACH OF THE DEMAND SIZES IN [10,300]) THEY LEAD
TO THE LOWEST OVERALL COST.
Chooser 1L, NR 1L, RO 1LSN, NR 1LS, RO
EU-basic, SC 79% 64% 80% 47%
FID SW 48% 53% 45% 55%
SRO 43% 49% 42% 63%
EU-basic, SC 78% 61% 76% 47%
FD SW 52% 52% 52% 45%
SRO 45% 50% 43% 70%
EU-sparse, SC 46% 59% 46% 52%
FID SW 53% 31% 54% 41%
SRO 31% 41% 31% 47%
RO: optional relocation; NR: no relocation; 1L: single link failure protec-
tion; 1LS: protection against single failures of either a link or a server;
1LSN: single link failure and 1:N server protection.
price paid is a modest increase in the number of required
servers, still resulting in a net cost benefit.
When we want to protect against both single link and server
failures (1LS) and relocate, clearly we need more resources
than for the 1L case, and especially extra servers4. That backup
server capacity can, however, be quite optimally shared among
all failure scenarios, so that (for the assumed uniform traffic)
we need about 1/K extra server capacity (versus 1/N for 1:N
server protection without relocation; recall that we used N = 1
in the results presented). To exploit that shared server capacity
maximally, we need some extra wavelengths to reroute towards
an alternate location. Thus, the RO, 1LS case needs more
4Observe that the total amount of server resources in the 1LS case cannot
be trivially calculated exactly, since we allow sharing of that backup server
capacity for protection against different failure cases: total backup server
capacity may depend on the chosen locations, and certainly their number.
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Fig. 4. For the EU-sparse topology the relative difference in total cost between the intelligent choosers SW, SC, SRO again is limited. The relative cost
difference in the right hand side graphs is defined as cost(x)/average cost(SC) − 1, where error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval. (RO: optional
relocation; NR: no relocation; 1L: single link failure protection; 1LS: protection against single failures of either a link or a server; 1LSN: single link failure
and 1:N server protection.)
network capacity than the RO, 1L case. Yet, we note that the
overall total cost (accounting for both server and wavelength
capacity) increase of RO, 1LS compared to NR, 1L is quite
limited (and clearly much smaller than the NR, 1LSN case).
Regarding the influence of the number of server sites K,
we note in Table IV that for increasing K, (i) the relative
advantage of exploiting relocation in terms of reduced network
capacity becomes more significant, while (ii) the price paid
in terms of increased server capacity diminishes for the 1LS
case. This is intuitively clear: when we increase the number
of server locations, a backup path to an alternate destination
becomes shorter, thus the network capacity drops further. In
the 1LS case, it is beneficial to relocate to protect against
server failures, and we can reuse its associated extra network
capacity to recover also from link failures. (As indicated
above, the additional server capacity can be limited to around
1/K by exploiting relocation.) For sufficiently high number
of server locations, we thus observe that for large demand
instances exploiting relocation even allows to protect against
both single link and single server failures (1LS, RO) at a
lower cost than merely covering single link failures without
relocating (1L, NR) — at least in the considered case of
uniform traffic.
In Fig. 6, we show the influence of topology on relocation
benefits. As in our earlier work [31] (where we only considered
network capacity), we find that relocation is especially benefi-
cial in sparse topologies. Intuitively, it is clear that in a sparser
network it is more likely that a backup path (disjoint from
the working path) towards a different destination is shorter
than one to the original end point (e.g., think of a simple ring
network). Hence, we expect more network savings (i.e., lower
total number of wavelengths) can be reached in such a sparse
topology by exploiting relocation. Our results confirm this. If
the network is very dense (recall that EU-dense has an average
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Table IV
THE PROS AND CONS OF EXPLOITING RELOCATION: RO INCURS A
SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN TOTAL WAVELENGTH CAPACITY COMPARED
TO NR, WHILE A PRICE IS PAID IN TERMS OF INCREASED SERVER
CAPACITY. RESULTS LISTED ARE RELATIVE DIFFERENCES COMPARED TO
THE 1L, NR, AVERAGED OVER THE DEMAND CASES ∆v ∈ [100, 350], FOR
EU-BASIC, FID AND SERVER COST FACTOR α = 1.
Case K Total wavelengths Total servers Total cost
1L, RO 3 −8.9% +7.5% −5.0%
5 −14.3% +6.1% −8.6%
7 −18.3% +6.4% −10.5%
1LS, RO 3 −3.9% +29.9% +4.3%
5 −8.9% +20.5% −0.5%
7 −11.8% +14.3% −3.2%
node degree of 4.29), the net advantage of RO disappears
if we only protect against single network link failures (1L).
Nevertheless, if we need to protect against both server and
link failures (1LS), relocation still may offer an advantage.
However, this advantage stems quasi uniquely from reduced
server resources: the difference there boils down to an increase
of the total number of servers with a factor 1 + 1/K for RO,
versus a factor 1 + 1/N for NR with 1:N protection (recall
that plotted results assume N = 1).
C. Providing failure-dependent backup path routing
Coming now to the difference between failure dependent
(FD) and failure independent (FID) backup path routing, we
first of all note that the discussion above (on the advantages
of exploiting relocation, and the impact of the number of
server sites K therein) continues to hold qualitatively. The
main interest of our current discussion pertains to the possible
advantage of adopting backup paths that may be adapted to
the failure at hand. Intuitively, we do expect possibly lower
resource requirements (especially in terms of wavelengths) of
such a FD approach compared to FID. Yet, earlier work on
simple unicast routing problems (thus without the opportunity
to exploit relocation and hence potentially increasing capacity
sharing) reported limited advantages in terms of network
capacity [42], [48].
Our results presented in Fig. 7, comparing the respective
cases in terms of exploiting relocation and server/link protec-
tion scenarios, confirm the expectation that FID never outper-
forms FD. Also, for a small number of server sites (K = 3) we
note that the deviations, i.e., cost(FD)/cost(FID)−1, are quite
limited: below 1% for the NR cases, and mostly below 2% for
the RO cases (in line with known results for unicast traffic).
However, for larger K, the advantage of adopting FD becomes
more substantial when exploiting relocation: e.g., for K = 7
network capacity reduces with around 6% when protecting
against both link and server failures (RO, 1LS).
While FD thus offers advantages in terms of capacity sav-
ings, we remark that it implies higher operational complexity:
more state to maintain (i.e., multiple pre-computed routes to
be stored as routing state), and conditional switching to one of
the possibly many backup paths based on proper identification
of the observed failure (versus unconditional switching to the
single backup for any failure affecting the primary for FID).
Table V
RUNNING TIMES ON THE EU-BASIC TOPOLOGY, USING THE SC CHOOSER:
MINIMUM, AVERAGE AND MAXIMUM OVER ALL 100 EXPERIMENTS (I.E.,
10 RUNS FOR EACH OF THE 10 DEMAND INSTANCES) PER SCENARIO.
TIMES ARE FORMATTED AS days:hours:min:s.
NR, 1L NR, 1LSN RO, 1L RO, 1LS
FID min 6:51:51 10:46:54 9:30:07 7:26:12
avg 22:41:57 1:01:38:07 2:01:31:41 21:59:53
max 1:20:11:21 2:10:34:43 2:23:31:38 2:00:45:16
FD min 4 3 3 5
avg 5:47 6:13 2:32 3:05
max 1:55:24 48:02 43:24 1:13:11
D. Runtime comparison
As stated previously, we found that the FD problem was
solvable in its single ILP form, as opposed to the FID case
where we had to resort to column generation. In Table V, this
higher complexity of FID is also demonstrated by the running
times we recorded for our case studies reported above. Our
implementation in Java, using IBM ILOG CPLEX 12.5, was
run on cluster infrastructure composed of IBM HS 21 XM
blades, where each such blade has 8 cores (dual-socket quad-
core Intel Xeon L5420 at 2.5GHz, with 6MB L2 cache per
quad-core chip) and 16GB RAM. We observe that solving the
column generation FID case on average requires in the order
of one full day, whereas the FD case can be solved on average
in less than 10 minutes. Intuitively, this can be explained
by the greater degree of flexibility in choosing routes in the
failure-dependent (FD) case: in each of the failure scenarios
under consideration, we can adapt the backup routes more
or less independently of other failure cases, and all we aim
to optimize is the maximal capacity needed over all these
failure scenarios. This indeed is less complex than finding the
single(!) backup route configuration that should be used under
any failure, which the failure-independent (FID) case solves.
VII. CONCLUSION
In grid/cloud scenarios, users are typically not concerned
with the exact location their applications end up being run.
This leads to the additional complexity in network dimen-
sioning (as in online routing/scheduling of the requests) of
choosing an appropriate location for each demand, cf. the
anycast routing principle. Yet, it also offers optimization
opportunities: upon failures we can choose to use different
data center locations to serve the corresponding requests.
Thus, we can exploit this relocation to minimize the amount
of network and server resources required to fulfill a given
demand. In this paper, we quantitatively assess the net benefit
that relocation may bring in an optical grid/cloud scenario, in
terms of total cost comprising both servers and network capac-
ity (i.e., wavelengths). To this end, we developed ILP-based
solutions to decide, in a two-step approach, on (S1) the K
best locations to install servers (i.e., the data center locations),
and (S2) the required network and server capacity, as well as
routing of the requests towards the data centers. We considered
both (i) failure-independent (FID) backup routing, where each
working path is protected by a single backup path to cover for
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Fig. 5. When the number of server sites K increases, the advantage of exploiting relocation (RO) becomes more pronounced. The relative decrease in network
capacity compared to no relocation (NR) rises, and the penalty of additional server capacity diminishes. Eventually (K = 7), we can provide protection by
relocation against single link or server failures (RO, 1LS)) at lower overall cost than single link failure protection without relocating (NR, 1L). Error bars
indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
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Fig. 6. When the topology becomes more dense, the advantage of exploiting relocation (RO) diminishes. When the topology becomes sufficiently dense (EU-
dense), opportunities to find paths to an alternate destination that are shorter than a backup path to the same primary destination are limited: potential network
savings for RO eventually disappear. Graphs show, from left to right: (i) relative total cost compared to the NR, 1L case, (ii) total number of wavelengths,
(iii) total number of servers. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals derived from the 10 instances per data point.
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Fig. 7. The advantage of failure-dependent (FD) backup paths only appears if the number of sever sites K increases (K = 3, 5, 7 from top to bottom). This
can be seen from the relative cost values cost(FD)/cost(FID), with cost being, from left to right: (i) total cost, (ii) total number of wavelengths, (iii) total
number of servers. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals derived from the 10 random instances per data point.
all failure scenarios affecting the working one, and (ii) failure-
dependent (FD) backup routing where the protecting path can
be varied depending on the failure scenario. Our methodology
is generic with respect to the possible failure scenarios, as long
as the failure can be modeled as a joint failure of multiple links
in the network model (i.e., as a shared risk link group, SRLG).
In our case studies, we find that for protection against single
network link failures (1L), or against single failures of either
a network link or a server (1LS), exploiting relocation (RO)
can be beneficial in terms of total cost, accounting for both
network and server capacity. Adopting RO to protect against
single link failures incurs extra server capacity (compared
to sticking to the same destination data center as under
failure free conditions, i.e., NR), but that cost increase is
more than outweighed by a reduction in network capacity.
Particularly for the case where we protect also against single
server failures (1LS), the net advantage of exploiting relocation
(RO) can be more substantial, since even also in terms of
server resources the cost can be lowered. Yet, note that the
latter conclusion may differ for larger values of N in the
considered 1:N server protection scheme. Also, the benefits
of exploiting relocation depend on both topology and number
of data center locations. For sparser topologies, the benefits of
RO are more pronounced (while they can disappear for very
dense topologies). When the number of data center sites K
increases, relocation advantages become more significant.
Similar to studies considering unicast traffic, we find that
the net advantage, in terms of total network and server cost, of
adopting a failure-dependent (FD) backup routing strategy is
fairly limited. Yet, this advantage increases for larger K, and
compared to failure-independent (FID) backup routing further
reduces the total server and network resources when we exploit
relocation, and especially when covering for both single net-
work link and single server failures: in those cases FD seems to
be valuable as to reduce overall resource capacity requirements
(despite increasing control plane level complexity).
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